THE MESOPOTAMIA^ CAMPAIGN. 117

quarters, he had concentrated the Naval Flotilla,, the 3rd
Corps, and the Cavalry Division at Aziziyeh, and had made
excellent progress with his administrative re-organisation.
Unfortunately., the pause in the operations was usefully
turned to account by the enemy, too, who availed himself of
the sorely-needed respite to organise a last attempt to bai
the road to Baghdad and to effect a junction between the two
widely-separated Corps (the XIII and XVIII) of Ms army.

On the 5th March, when G-eneral Maude advanced from
Aziziyeh, he found himself resolutely opposed by a force of
infantry and artillery at Lajj, twently miles up-stream, which
held up the advance of the Cavalry all day. The force with-
drew by night, and the British advance went on. On the
morning of the 7th, ©position was met on the line of the
river Diyala, where the Turks were found to be holding a
position on the right bank of the river on a front of about
thirteen miles. Deeming the enemy's force to be nothing
more than a rearguard, General Maude ordered the 3rd Corps
to force a crossing of the Diyala on the night of the 7th/8th,
while he constructed a bridge across the Tigris at Bawi,
ten miles dbwn stream, over which he could pass troops to the
right bank to advance direct upon Baghdad. The Diyala
proved to be strongly held by the remnants of the XVIII
Corps, and the first attempt to cross the river failed—nor
was it until 0400 hours <te the 10th that the 13th Division
of the 3rd Corps succeeded. The fighting at the Diyala
was very fierce, and great gallantry was displayed by a party
of about one hundred men of the Forth Lancashire Regiment
who forced their way on to the right bank of the riyer on
the 8th and hung on, completely isolated, during the whole
of the 9th., until the arrival of the 13th Division on the 10th.

While this unexpectedly severe fighting on the left bank of
the Tigris was going on, General Maude turned his attention
to the right bank, where he intended the Cavalry Division
and the 1st Corps to advance rapidly on Baghdad. It was
not until 1800 hours on the 8th that the Cavalry Division

fot across the bridge which had -been constructed at Bawi;
allowed an hour and a half later by the leading brigade
of the leading division of the 1st Corps. The maps
in use were inaccurate, no previous reconnaissance had
been possible, the area of operations was freely intersected by
deep canals; "consequently the rate of advance was slow.
However, the Cavalry Division plodded on, receiving informa-
tion at 2130 hours from an air reconnaissance that Turkish
trenches had been seen on the Umm at Tubal sandhills
(between the Tigris and the south-east end of Lake